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This study was designed to examine selective processing of emotional information in
depression. It focuses on possible attentional biases in depression, and whether such biases
constitute a cognitive vulnerability factor to suffer from the disorder or, on the contrary,
they reflect a feature associated exclusively with the clinical level of depression. 81
participants were included in the study: 15 with a diagnosis of Major Depression; 17
were diagnosed as Dysthymia; 11 participants scored over 18 in the Beck Depression
Inventory (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979); 15 participants, in whom a sad mood
state was induced by an experimental mood induction (Velten technique + music, or
biographical recall + music); and 23 participants as a normal-control group. All participants
were presented with the emotional Stroop task. The data indicated that attentional bias
was only present in the group of patients with Major Depression, so it does not seem to
be a cognitive vulnerability factor for this disorder.
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En este trabajo se examina el procesamiento selectivo de la información emocional en
depresión. Los objetivos se centran en comprobar, en primer lugar, si existen o no sesgos
atencionales en la depresión y, en segundo lugar, si estos sesgos constituyen un factor
de vulnerabilidad cognitiva a padecer el trastorno o si, por el contrario, reflejan una
característica asociada exclusivamente al nivel clínico de depresión. Los participantes
fueron 15 pacientes con diagnóstico de Depresión Mayor, 17 pacientes con diagnóstico
de Distimia, 11 personas con una puntuación superior a 18 en el Inventario de Depresión
de Beck (Beck, Rush, Shaw y Emery, 1979), 15 personas a las que se indujo un estado
de ánimo triste (técnica Velten con música, o recuerdo autobiográfico con música) y 23
personas "controles". Todos los sujetos cumplimentaron la tarea Stroop emocional. Los
datos indicaron que el sesgo atencional sólo se manifestaba en el subgrupo de Depresión
Mayor, por lo que no parece constituir un factor de vulnerabilidad cognitiva para la depresión.
Palabras clave: depresión, vulnerabilidad, sesgos atencionales, tarea Stroop
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One of the basic assumptions of cognitive-experimental
approaches to psychopatholgy of emotional disorders is
that there are differences in the way emotional information
is processed, depending on whether or not there is
pathology. However, one of the most important issues still
to be settled is whether such cognitive biases constitute a
vulnerability factor for these disorders or, on the contrary,
they are part of their clinical features. Beck’s cognitive
model (1967, 1976, 1987), based on the concept of
“schemata,” is the starting point in most of these studies.
According to Beck, the schemata used by depressed people
are negative, and lead to selective filtering out of positive
information and to exaggeration of negative information.
Beck’s model predicts that mood-congruent biases will be
revealed in all stages of processing (perception, encoding,
attention, storage, and recall).
Attention, in particular, is one of the cognitive processes
affected in many psychological disorders. In depression,
distractibility and difficulty in concentrating are two of the
most frequent complaints reported by patients, and they are
among the symptoms of the “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders, 4th edition” (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994) criteria for the diagnosis of major depression
and dysthymia. In cognitive psychology, when referring to
attentional biases, psychologists do not mean general
distractibility, but a change in the direction of the focus of
attention, so people are more aware of a part, or a certain
aspect, of their environment (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, &
Mathews, 1988, 1997). In anxiety disorders, it has been
demonstrated that patients show attentional bias towards
threatening information that is congruent with the disorder.
In the body of literature regarding attentional biases, two
main strategies have been used: a) showing how the tendency
to pay attention to certain environmental stimuli facilitates
the subjects’ performance in the tasks, and b) showing how
the same trend deteriorates performance. The Emotional Stroop
Color-Naming Task, which is probably the most widely tool
used in the study of attentional biases, has become the main
experimental paradigm in literature about cognition and
emotion and it belongs to the second strategy. In the emotional
Stroop task, the subject is shown words whose emotional
content represents the core themes that characterize the
disorder under study (for example, threat for anxiety, sadness
and hopelessness for depression). This emotional content has
a disruptive effect on the individual’s cognitive functioning
because it is related to the theme of the person’s disorder
(Williams et al., 1997). Attentional bias is revealed by the
interference effect of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), produced
by the competition between the task required (naming the
color) and the automatic and preconscious processing of the
printed words (attentional bias). The time subjects spend
responding to the stimuli is the dependent variable measured
in the Stroop task. Numerous studies that have used the Stroop
task have shown that the response time in naming the color
in which an emotional word is printed is greater in those
persons who are affected by an emotional disorder (Williams
et al., 1997). Most researchers assume that the effect caused
by the emotional stimuli in tasks such as the Stroop is due
to the stimuli capturing the person’s attentional resources.
Data supporting the existence of attentional bias towards
emotional information are much sounder in anxiety than in
depression (Dalgleish & Watts, 1990; MacLeod, Mathews,
& Tata, 1986). Several studies have used the Stroop task to
investigate processing biases in generalized anxiety disorder
(e.g., Martin, Williams, & Clark, 1991; Mathews, Mogg,
Kentish, & Eysenck, 1995; Mogg, Bradley, Williams, &
Mathews, 1993), post-traumatic stress disorder (Cassiday,
McNally, & Zeitlin, 1992; Kaspi, McNally, & Amir, 1995;
McNally et al., 1994; McNally, English, & Lipke, 1993;
McNally, Rienmann, & Kim, 1990), obssesive-compulsive
disorder (Foa & McNally, 1986; Lavy, van Oppen, & van
den Hout, 1994), social phobia (Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, &
Dombeck, 1990; Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993), and
simple phobias, such as spider phobia (Lavy, van den Hout,
& Arntz, 1993; Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986)
and snake phobia (Mathews & Sebastian, 1993). It has been
found that people affected by these disorders show
significantly more interference in color-naming threatening
words, and words related to their disorder, than neutral words.
Regarding depression, not only are there fewer studies, but
also, the differential results are confusing and not very
conclusive (Carter, Maddock, & Magliozzi, 1992; Gotlib &
Cane, 1987; Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Hill & Dutton, 1989;
Hill & Knowles, 1991; Klieger & Cordner, 1990; Mogg et
al., 1993; Segal & Vella, 1990).
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether or
not there are attentional biases in depression. If so, depressed
individuals would display selective attention towards the
negative aspects of the information they are shown, but this
would not occur with the individuals who had no emotional
disorder. Another aim was to find out whether these differences
constitute a cognitive vulnerability factor for the disorder or,
on the contrary, they reflect a feature linked exclusively to the
clinical level of depression. It is possible that attentional biases
are simply the result of a sad or depressed mood, or that they
must be accompanied by other signs and symptoms that are
typical of depression (without reaching clinical significance)
in order to appear. Bearing these goals in mind, the exploratory
hypotheses in this study were as follows:
1. If there is attentional bias in depressive disorders, the
individuals with a clinical diagnosis of depression (groups
of Major Depression – MD – and Dysthymia – Dy),
compared to normal individuals (control group), will be
significantly slower in color-naming depression-related
negative words than positive ones.
2. With regard to the vulnerability issue:
2.1) If attentional bias does not constitute a vulnerability
factor, but is another feature of depressive disorders, then
only the clinical groups (MD and Dy), compared to normal
individuals (control group), to participants with a sad mood
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(induction group), and to those with a subclinical level of
depression (subclinical group), will be significantly slower
in color-naming depression-related negative words than
positive ones.
2.2) If attentional bias is a vulnerability factor related
not only to mood, but requiring the presence of other signs
and symptoms of depression (such as motivation, self-
valuation, etc.) in order to appear, then individuals with a
subclinical level of depression (subclinical group), assessed
by questionnaires such as the Beck Depression Inventory
(Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), and depressed
individuals (MD and Dy groups) will be significantly slower
in color-naming negative words than positive ones, compared
to normal and sad participants (control and induction groups).
2.3) If attentional bias is simply the result of a sad mood,
all participants except the normal group (control group) will
be significantly slower in color-naming depression-related
negative words than positive ones.
Method
Participants
A total of 81 participants were tested. Forty-nine were
undergraduate students from different areas, excepting
Psychology, recruited by means of an advertisement that
asked for volunteers to participate in a psychological study
in return for a reward (2,000 pesetas); they had no
psychological disorder, either past or present, at the moment
of the study. The remaining 32 were patients from the Lliria
Unit of Mental Health (Unidad de Salud Mental de Lliria),
a public mental-health facility to which they had been referred
by the general practitioner. There were 52 women and 29
men whose ages ranged from 15 to 55 years (M = 28.29,
SD = 12.35). We distributed the participants into 5 groups:
1) Major Depression (MD): 15 patients (6 men, 9 women)
whose main diagnosis was major depression, according to
the “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
3rd edition” (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) criteria.
(At the time of the study, the Spanish edition of the DSM-
IV was not available.)
2) Dysthymia (Dy): 17 patients (5 men, 12 women)
whose main diagnosis was dysthymia, according to DSM-
III-R criteria.
3) Subclinical: 11 individuals (4 men, 7 women) who
obtained a score ‡ 18 in the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI;
Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), but could not be
described as presenting a clinical depressive disorder because
they had not sought psychological assistance at any point in
their lives. 
4) Induction: 15 individuals (7 men, 8 women) with no
clinical diagnosis, who underwent a mood induction procedure
to induce a sad mood in them.
5) Control: 23 individuals (7 men, 16 women) with no
emotional disorder, who underwent no experimental mood
induction, and whose BDI scores were not clinically
significant (≤ 13).
Participants who answered the advertisement were
assigned to the subclinical, induction, and control groups.
Participants of the induction and control groups were randomly
assigned to their groups. All individuals with a score ‡ 18 in
the BDI were automatically assigned to the subclinical group,
because of methodological and ethical issues. The final
composition of the sample is shown in Table 1.
Procedure
Clinical sample. The day the patients came to the Mental
Health Unit, they received a DSM-III-R diagnosis by an
expert clinician (psychiatrist or psychologist). If they met
MD or Dy criteria, they had a structured interview, which
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Table 1
Number of Participants in each Group by Sex; and Age Range (Means and Standard Deviations) of each Group
GROUPS
Control Induction Subclinical Dy MD TOTAL
SEX
Women 16 8 7 12 9 52
Men 7 7 4 5 6 29
AGE
Range 18-44 18-23 18-48 15-55 17-55 15-55
M 22.67 20.35 23.18 38.76 38.13 28.29
SD 6.32 1.50 8.85 13.42 13.61 12.35
Note. Dy = dysthymia; MD = major depression.
included demographic data and a clinical record, with the
psychologist of the Unit (M.A.R.). Only those cases in which
there was inter-judge agreement on the diagnosis were
included. If the patients met the remaining selection criteria
(voluntary consent, not having past or present history of
alcoholism, substance abuse, or severe organic disease, not
receiving medication) they were scheduled to complete the
BDI and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger,
1983), and to perform the Stroop task on the following day.
Nonclinical sample. The experimental session started with
a screening interview to make sure the individuals were free
from any mental disorder and that they had not had any in
the past. Next, they filled in the psychometric measures (BDI,
STAI). Participants did not know either the real purpose of
the research or the group to which they had been assigned,
nor were they familiar with the mood induction procedures
or the Stroop task. After completing the questionnaires, the
subclinical and control groups performed the Stroop task, and
participants from the induction group were randomly assigned
to the mood induction procedures. Two procedures were used
(equal number of subjects in each one): reading Velten
sentences while listening to a piece of music, and recalling
a biographic memory while listening to a piece of music.
Both procedures have proved to be effective in inducing
different moods (García-Palacios, 1995; Kenealy, 1986; Larsen
& Sinnet, 1991; Martin, 1990b; Martin, Argyle, & Crossland,
1990). To apply the Velten procedure, we designed a list of
10 self-referent sentences, similar to those used by Velten in
1968. (For example, “I think life is empty and meaningless”;
“Only bad things happen to me”; “Nobody loves me”; etc.)
Participants were required to read the sentences slowly to
themselves, as long as the induction lasted (10 minutes),
paying attention to their emotional content, and thinking about
the sentences as though they referred specifically to them.
The procedure of recalling a memory consisted of asking the
subjects to recall any sad biographic memory and to think
about it, trying to bring back the feelings, thoughts, and
emotions that surrounded the event. As the subjects read the
Velten sentences or recalled a memory, they listened to a 10-
minute piece of Barber’s “Adagio for Strings.” The instructions
were recorded on a tape. Both mood induction procedures
(Velten + Music, and Recall + Music) were effective in
changing the participants’ mood in the expected direction:
the change in the subjective appraisal of their sad mood,
measured by means of a visual analogical scale ranging from
0 to 100, was above 15%. After the induction, the participants
performed the Stroop task.
Materials
The Stroop task consisted of three conditions: trial,
depression, and elation. Five DIN-A4 cards (21 x 29.7 cm.)
were designed, with 72 words arranged in 6 columns of 12
words each. The cards were printed in capital letters using
red, blue, yellow, and green. Words were distributed so that
neither color nor word were placed in adjacent locations on
the card. The trial condition consisted of rows of zeros
(00000), considered neutral stimuli. The emotional Stroop
condition consisted of sad-content adjectives (depression) and
happy-content adjectives (elation). These stimuli were the
same as those used in the study by Ruipérez and Belloch
(1997), in which the words were selected in two phases. First,
a 200-word list was composed, using words from published
literature that had employed traits with depressive content,
and from various instruments for measuring depression. Then,
ten expert judges (clinical psychologists and psychiatrists)
assessed the appropriateness of the traits to describe negative
and positive personal characteristics. The final selection was
based on the traits that obtained a score of 6 or over in one
category, and 3 or under in the other. Because in Spanish,
adjectives have a masculine and a feminine form, we prepared
two cards for each emotional condition, so the stimuli would
be in accordance with the participant’s sex. First, the trial
card was presented to all participants. The presentation order
of the remaining 2 cards was randomized, with the only
condition that half of the subjects of every group were
presented with the depression card after the trial card and the
other half was presented with the elation card. Time was
measured in milliseconds, using a chronometer. The pool of
words, and their English translation, is shown in Table 2.
Results
Demographic variables
The only statistical difference among groups in
demographic variables was in the variable age: the MD and
Dy groups were significantly different and older than the
other groups, p < .05. The distribution of both sexes among
groups was similar, c2(4, N = 81) = 1.459, p = .834.
Psychometric variables
Table 3 shows the statistics from the questionnaires that
the participants filled in. Each variable was subjected to a one-
way ANOVA to establish the statistical significance of the
differences, as well as subsequently analyzing the direction of
the effects. The results showed that the groups were statistically
different in all the psychometric variables: BDI, F(4, 76) =
37.79, p < .001, STAI-Trait, F(4, 76) = 12.35, p < .001; and
STAI-State, F(4, 76) = 9.24, p < .001. For the BDI, as expected,
the nonclinical groups (control and induction) obtained lower
scores than the subclinical and clinical groups (MD and Dy).
All the post Scheffé comparisons between clinical versus
nonclinical groups were statistically significant, p < .001.
For the STAI-Trait, control and induction groups were not
statistically different, and neither were there statistical differences
among the subclinical, MD, and Dy groups. However, the
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control group was statistically different from the subclinical, p
< .005, Dy, p < .001, and MD groups, p < .001; the induction
group differed statistically from Dy, p = .003, and from MD,
p = .013, but not from the subclinical group, p = .08.
In the STAI-State, control and induction groups were not
statistically different, and there were no statistical differences
among the subclinical, MD, and Dy groups. The control group
was statistically different from the subclinical, p = .008, Dy,
p = .007, and MD, p < .001, groups. The induction group
differed from MD, p = .017 but not from the subclinical,
p = .194, nor from the Dy group, p = .258.
Stroop Task
The aim of the Stroop task was to demonstrate the existence
of attentional bias in depression towards emotionally congruent
stimuli. This would be revealed in the various group response
times, and for the different Stroop conditions. Table 4 offers
the means and standard deviations of the response time (in
milliseconds) for each group and each Stroop condition.
A repeated measures ANOVA Stroop x Group was carried
out, with group as the between-variable and Stroop as the
within-variable. The results showed that the main effect for
Stroop was not significant, F(1, 76) = .06, p < .808, which
means that the response times in the different emotional Stroop
cards (elation and depression) were similar. However, the main
effect of group was statistically significant, F(1, 76) = 27.442,
p < .0001, that is, the clinical groups took longer to color-
name the Stroop stimuli than the remaining groups. The
interaction Stroop x Group was also statistically significant,
F(1, 76) = 3.026, p < .023, which means that the groups
behaved differently, depending on the Stroop condition they
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Table 2
Stroop Stimuli (Spanish version in brackets)
ELATION                                                                   DEPRESSION
Active [Activo/a] Good [Bueno/a] Aloof [Retraído/a] Nervous [Nervioso/a]
Amusing [Divertido/a] Happy [Feliz] Boring [Aburrido/a] Unsuccessful [Fracasado/a]
Brave [Valiente] Healthy [Sano/a] Coward [Cobarde] Overworked [Agobiado/a]
Calm [Tranquilo/a] Interesting [Interesante] Depressed [Abatido/a] Oversensitive [Sensible]
Charming [Encantador/a] Lively [Animado/a] Desperate [Desesperado/a] Sad [Triste]
Confident [Confiado/a] Nice [Agradable] Embittered [Amargado/a] Spiritless [Apagado/a]
Contented [Contento/a] Optimistic [Optimista] Gloomy [Sombrío/a] Tearful [Lloroso/a]
Daring [Atrevido/a] Resolute [Decidido/a] Helpless [Indefenso/a] Unfortunate [Desdichado/a]
Efficient [Eficaz] Satisfied [Satisfecho/a] Sorrowful [Pesaroso/a] Unhappy [Infeliz]
Fortunate [Afortunado/a] Sociable [Sociable] Irresolute [Indeciso/a] Finished [Acabado/a]
Friendly [Simpático/a] Strong [Fuerte] Lonely [Solitario/a] Sickly [Enfermizo/a]
Funny [Gracioso/a] Vital [Enérgico/a] Melancholic [Apenado/a] Wretched [Desgraciado/a]
Glad [Alegre] Miserable [Miserable]
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of the Groups in the BDI and the STAI
GROUPS
Instruments Control Induction Subclinical Dy MD TOTAL
BDI M 9.08 8.18 22.36 23.71 28.33 17.04
SD 3.93 5.36 3.01 7.23 9.66 10.35
STAI-S M 14.71 19.29 29.55 27.76 32.80 23.45
SD 6.66 9.71 15.90 12.75 9.43 12.55
STAI-T M 23.21 26.53 38.36 41.59 40.07 32.60
SD 10.44 11.01 6.34 10.97 11.13 12.91
Note. Dy = dysthymia; MD = major depression; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; STAI-S = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (State);
STAI-T = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Trait).
faced. The results of these analyses can be seen in Figure 1.
An ANCOVA with repeated measures was carried out as well,
in which the co-variables were age, the BDI, the STAI-S, and
the STAI-T scores. We only include the results of the ANOVA,
because there were no statistically significant effects, so that
these variables were not considered relevant to attentional bias.
Post-hoc multiple comparisons (Scheffé, a = .05) revealed
that the MD group was significantly different from the rest
of groups, p < .001, and from the Dy group, p = .019, in the
elation condition. With regard to the Dy group, a significant
difference with the control group appeared in both conditions,
p < .001; a significant difference was also observed between
the Dy and the induction groups in both conditions, p < .05.
Discussion
One of our aims was to find evidence about the existence
of attentional bias towards mood-congruent information in
depressed individuals. The significance of the Stroop x Group
interaction indicates that the groups behaved differently,
depending on the Stroop condition they faced. However, only
the MD group took longer to color-name the stimuli of the
depression Stroop than those of the elation Stroop. The
remaining groups showed the opposite result: participants were
slower in the elation Stroop than in the depression Stroop.
Nonetheless, the difference in the response times for each
Stroop condition in the Dy and the control groups was barely
evident. These data lend partial support to our first hypothesis:
only the MD group showed significant emotional interference
concerning negatively toned information. This is in accordance
with the results obtained by Gotlib and Cane (1987) who,
using self-descriptive adjectives with emotionally depressive
content and emotionally manic content in their Stroop cards,
found that the group of depressive patients, compared to the
nondepressed group, obtained significantly higher response
times for the depression words than for the elation words.
Carter, Maddock, and Magliozzi (1992) found that individuals
diagnosed as MD (DSM-III-R criteria), compared to a control
group, showed just a trend (nonsignificant) towards greater
interference in the depression Stroop. Segal and Vella (1990)
applied a priming methodology to the Stroop task to examine
cognitive organization in depression. They used a sample of
patients with major depression (Research Diagnostic Criteria,
RDC; Spitzer, Endicott, & Robins, 1978), who showed
significantly more interference in the self-descriptive depression
adjectives than in the neutral or personally irrelevant adjectives.
These results suggested the existence of attentional bias in
depression. However, in the study by Mogg et al. (1993), the
emotional Stroop task was also administered to a clinical
sample (diagnosis of MD and Generalized Anxiety Disorder,
according to DSM-III-R criteria) and to normal subjects; the
MD group did not show the Stroop interference effect in the
depression words in either of the Stroop conditions (subliminal
and supraliminal). Therefore, our data support the majority of
studies that used samples of MD patients.
The second aim of our study was the issue of cognitive
vulnerability to suffer from depression. We wished to find out
whether attentional bias constitutes a vulnerability factor
capable of predisposing individuals to suffer from an episode
of depression in the future, or whether it constitutes another
symptom of the disorder that only appears when the disorder
is present. In order to answer this issue, we grouped our sample
so the groups could be placed along a hypothetical continuum.
At the lower end of this continuum would be those individuals
with no emotional disorder (control group), followed by those
GALLARDO, BAÑOS, BELLOCH, AND RUIPÉREZ16
Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations (in brackets) of Response Times (Measured in Milliseconds) in the Stroop Task
Stroop condition GROUPS
Control Induction Subclinical Dysthymia MD
Depression 4506 (912) 5045 (889) 5355 (1067) 6833 (1126) 9248 (1595)
Elation 4532 (920) 5259 (977) 5820 (1668) 6879 (1165) 8660 (1263)
Note. MD = major depression.
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Figure 1. Response times (milliseconds) in the Stroop task.
presenting no clinical condition but who had undergone a
mood induction procedure (induction group). Next would be
the group of clinical analogues (subclinical group), that is,
individuals with no clinical depression but whose high scores
in the BDI allowed us to consider that they had not only the
sad mood that is characteristic of depression, but also other
signs and symptoms commonly present in the clinical form
of the disorder. Finally, at the upper end of our continuum
would be those individuals with a clinical diagnosis of
dysthymia or major depression (Dy and MD groups). Using
this continuum, we intended to discriminate at which point
attentional bias (in the form of the Stroop interference effect)
would appear. Depending on the result, we would obtain
empirical support on the issue of attentional bias as a
vulnerability factor for depression.
As stated, only the MD group showed significant
interference in the depression Stroop. These results, therefore,
do not support our hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3: neither a simple
sad mood nor a subclinical depression condition seems to
reveal attentional bias for depression-related material, and thus
we cannot state that bias is a vulnerability factor for depression.
Furthermore, the subclinical and induction groups not only
showed no bias towards the mood-congruent information, but
they were also slower in color-naming the positive words than
the negative ones. This trend leads us to examine the possibility
of an avoidance bias towards negatively toned material in
individuals with sad mood but no emotional disorder. In this
sense, such a bias would “protect” them from processing this
kind of aversive information.
Our data are, to some extent, different from those obtained
in other studies. In Gotlib and McCann’s (1984) work, the
Stroop task was applied to two groups of individuals divided
into depressed and nondepressed according to their score in
the BDI (cutting point ‡ 9); the depressed subjects obtained
significantly greater response times for the words that were
emotionally related to depression. To test whether the Stroop
effect was simply because of the subjects’ mood or other
features, Gotlib and McCann induced a sad mood and a
happy mood in a sample of normal participants. They verified
that there were no group differences in the performance on
the Stroop task for either positive or negative words. They
concluded that the subjects’ mood did not explain the Stroop
interference effect sufficiently. Klieger and Cordner (1990)
replicated this study to test whether the cognitive process
present in depression could be assessed by the Stroop task;
again, the response times were significantly greater in
dysphoric individuals compared to nondysphoric ones (BDI
criteria, cutting point ‡ 16) for the negative depression-related
words than for the positive ones. Our results with the
subclinical group have not replicated those obtained in these
studies. A possible explanation may be the different criteria
of what is considered a subclinical depression score using
the BDI. We chose a more conservative cutting point (‡ 18). 
Other studies about the influence of mood assessed
attentional bias in depressed subjects during their depressive
episode and after they had recovered. Gotlib and Cane (1987)
found that attentional bias assessed with the Stroop task was
only apparent when the patients were depressed and not once
they had recovered. In the McCabe and Gotlib study (1993),
although they used a dychotic listening task instead of the
traditional Stroop, individuals were significantly slower in
responding to light probes when negative-content words were
presented in the unattended channel than when neutral-content
words were presented. In the second session, recovered
patients no longer revealed attentional biases. Given these
results, it seems that there is attentional bias towards
emotional, negatively toned material, although this bias is
exclusively related to the clinical status of the disorder. These
results suggest that the bias may be another symptom that
would only appear when the disorder is present.
Nonetheless, the bias did not appear in our Dy group.
This result, contrary to what has just been stated, could be
explained by means of the hypothesis of “depressive realism”
(e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979, 1988). This hypothesis states
that depression is characterized by a lack of bias towards
positive information which, however, is present in
nondepressed people and whose function is to act as a
protection factor against depression. Furthermore, it has been
suggested that these biases may be a function of the severity
of depression, and that when people become mildly depressed
(which would be the case of dysthymia), they exhibit
unbiased cognitive functioning, but when depression becomes
more severe (which would be the case of major depression),
these people may show biases favoring negative information.
Our results support this hypothesis, because they suggest
that the clinical severity of the disorder is the factor playing
the mayor role in the manifestation of attentional bias to
mood-congruent negative information. However, our data
are not in accordance with the “depressive realism”
hypothesis, because the control group would be expected to
show bias favoring positive material, but their performance
was quite similar to that of the Dy group, as can be seen in
Figure 1. This lack of “positive biases” in the emotional
Stroop task in normal populations is quite a common result
in literature. In fact, considering the response times obtained
in other studies, people with no clinical disorder show no
differences in their response times to positive and negative
words (there are even studies in which these people are
slower in color-naming the negative words compared to the
positive words). Nonetheless, no study explicitly comments
on this fact, except the work by Gotlib and McCann (1984).
These authors pointed out that “positive biases” would only
be expected in tasks involving threat to the subject’s ego,
which is not the case of the emotional Stroop task. Therefore,
the absence of longer response latencies to positive words
in the “normal” individuals lends weight to this motivational
formulation. On the other hand, it could be that people with
no disorder, when confronted with sadness (induction and
subclinical groups), “protect” themselves against it by
avoiding negative and favoring positive material. In this case,
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they set up “self-protective biases.” This self-protection may
have a variety of adaptive consequences, such as maintaining
positive affect, self-esteem, and improving coping strategies,
as well as reducing the likelihood of hopelessness. Such a
mechanism was not observed in the Dy group which,
although sad (in contrast to the control group), did not show
any tendency to avoid negative information nor to protect
themselves against it (in contrast to the subclinical and
induction groups). However, in the MD group, this tendency
was the opposite, revealing attentional bias in favor of
negative over positive information.
It is important to bear in mind that there are several
factors that could influence the incidence of attentional
bias. The small size of the sample could disguise the effects
of bias. The studies by Gotlib and Cane (1987), and Carter
et al. (1992) employed larger samples (34 and 30 patients
with MD, respectively) than other studies, including ours,
where the number of individuals in the various groups
ranged from 11 to 25. This is an important issue because
sometimes the nonsignificance of the differences is due to
the inadequate size of the samples, and this does not
necessarily mean that bias does not exist. Even more
important is the issue of which subjects to include in the
samples. We have observed high variability and disparity
of criteria in the design of groups, especially regarding
clinical analogues. The cutting point that divides subjects
with subclinical depression from the nondepressed varies
greatly: ‡ 9 in Gotlib and McCann (1984), ‡ 16 in Klieger
and Cordner (1990), ‡ 10 in Hill and Dutton (1989), and
‡ 18 in our own study. Besides, inventories other than
Beck’s have been used, such as the Inventory to Diagnose
Depression (IDD: Zimmerman, Coryell, & Wilson, 1986)
in Hill and Knowles’ (1991) study. The use of poor
emotional measures and, especially, of inadequate pools of
stimuli are also important aspects to be considered when
analyzing data. Greenberg and Beck (1989) stated that there
is a specificity of content for depression that would
differentiate the cognitions of depressed subjects from those
of anxious subjects: the predominant themes in depression
are self-contempt, failure, incompetence, and pessimism.
Anxiety focuses on threat, danger, unpredictability, and
uncertainty. The stimuli used in the Stroop task when
studying attentional biases in depression have not always
been the most appropriate. Sometimes, the stimuli were
self-esteem threatening words (Hill & Dutton, 1989; Hill
& Knowles, 1991), physically threatening words (Carter et
al., 1992; MacLeod et al., 1986), socially threatening words
(MacLeod et al.), and achievement threatening and general
threatening words (Mogg et al., 1991). We think, along with
Hill and Knowles (1991), that the use of emotional stimuli
is essential, so that the Stroop interference effect will appear.
The pool of stimuli used in the current paper adheres to this
criterion. Another important difference between our study
and those cited above is that we compared five groups
simultaneously, whereas the remaining studies just compared
two groups, which could hinder reaching clear conclusions
about the role that attentional biases may play in vulnerability
towards depressive disorders.
Summing up, we found attentional bias to the mood-
congruent material in depression only when this disorder
turned into major depression. The bias did not appear in
milder but more chronic forms of the disorder, such as
dysthymia. Finally, according to our results, it seems that
the bias is limited to depression as a clinical entity, and it
does not seem to constitute a cognitive vulnerability factor
because it was not present in our analogue groups. Nor did
bias seem to be a result of a simple sad mood. Nevertheless,
more studies, using different clinical conditions, are needed
in order to state with some degree of certainty to what extent
attentional biases do, or do not, constitute a cognitive
vulnerability factor in depression.
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